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The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were an
enormous setback for the cause of nonviolence. They
provided a stimulus and ostensible justification for a
spiral of violence in which nonviolent alternatives are
marginalised. Nonviolence offers numerous ways to
oppose and prevent terrorism, but such responses are
totally at odds with the way government leaders
conceive the world.
At first glance, there is no reason why the attacks
should undermine nonviolent approaches in the
slightest. After all, proponents of nonviolence
unanimously condemned the attacks, just as they have
consistently promoted nonviolent methods of struggle
as an alternative to violence. The problem is that
nonviolent methods of challenging violence and
oppression have little visibility or credibility within
governments or mainstream media, where the only
credible response to terrorism is seen as military
attack, surveillance and repression.
At the core of nonviolent action is political jiu-jitsu
(Sharp, 1973). If nonviolent activists circulate a
petition, join a rally, go on strike or hold a vigil and are
countered by violence, such as beatings or killings,
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observers are likely to give increased support for the
activists. Violence used against nonviolent protesters is
widely seen as unjust and rebounds against those who
use violence. Through political jiu-jitsu, activists can
use the violence of their opponents to build support
and undermine their opponents' power.
Even a little violence on the side of the activists greatly
weakens political jiu-jitsu. This is why police often use
infiltrators to provoke violence by protesters, thereby
legitimising police violence, even when there is a great
inequality in the two sides' capacity for and use of
violence. During the intifada of 1987-1993,
Palestinians who threw stones against Israeli guns and
tanks reduced the perception of a qualitative difference
between the two sides.
So what happens is that violence legitimates
counterviolence. The 11 September attacks have
legitimated massive counterviolence, most obviously in
Afghanistan but also in the form of surveillance and
repression of social activists everywhere. US
government leaders have rhetorically linked terrorism
and dissent, helping to legitimate attacks on civil
liberties, including ways of undermining and
countering nonviolent protest.
The 11 September attacks reveal in stark form how
counterproductive violence is for promoting justice
and equality. They have provided the ideal pretext for
massive expansion in apparatuses for 'state security,'
including spying, detention, disruption and torture. By
the same token, the US government's military actions
will provoke greater support for terrorist approaches.
What results is a type of 'violence race,' analogous to
military races.

Nonviolence against Terrorism
One way that nonviolent approaches can be mobilised
against terrorism is by reducing the vulnerability of
high-technology societies to sabotage and terrorism.
Today, it requires only a small amount of equipment
and a few knowledgeable people to bring down a large
dam, a power plant or an oil refinery. A few computer
programmers can create chaos by disrupting
telecommunications or even just traffic lights in a large
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city. Large industrial plants can be brought to a halt by
damage in key places.
Industrial society's vulnerability to sabotage provides a
justification for military defence, since enemy troops
cannot be allowed access to key installations.
Imagine, on the other hand, a society relying on
nonviolent methods for defence. It would be unwise to
rely on large power plants, fertiliser plants or indeed
any other facility that could be easily destroyed or
occupied to hold a community to ransom. Instead,
technologies would need to be designed or chosen to
be robust against attack. Instead of large power plants,
energy efficiency and small-scale renewable energy
sources could be used. Microhydro would reduce
vulnerability compared to large dams. Organic farming
would be far less vulnerable than monocultures. This
sort of analysis can be applied to a range of
technologies (Martin, 2001).
In the light of the 11 September attacks, it seems that it
would be better to promote small-scale buildings
rather than giant office blocks and to carefully consider
the use of air transport. But beyond reducing physical
vulnerability, technologies should be chosen and
designed to foster a greater sense of community
solidarity which will in turn increase the capacity for
nonviolent struggle. For example, office buildings that
encourage workers to get to know each other and work
together are better for a nonviolent defence than ones
that foster isolation and alienation.
A second nonviolent option against terrorism is timely
awareness of the possibility of attacks so that steps can
be taken to prevent them. Conventionally this is called
'intelligence,' which involves collecting information
and drawing conclusions from it. The 11 September
attacks revealed a massive failure of conventional
intelligence despite annual expenditures of tens of
billions of dollars.
A forthcoming study by Dutch researcher Giliam de
Valk suggests a nonviolent 'intelligence system' would
do better. He compares the performance of Dutch
government intelligence services with the performance
of the Shipping Research Bureau (1995), a nongovernment operation that studied violations of UN
resolutions against South Africa's apartheid regime in
the 1980s. The Shipping Research Bureau did far
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better according to a whole range of criteria.
One of the big problems with spy operations is that
they operate in secrecy. This reduces communication
within agencies as well as with outsiders, and enables
inadequate thinking or incompetence to persist. The
Shipping Research Bureau, because it was open, could
better verify information by seeking reactions from
opponents such as shipping companies. It published
its reports and used subsequent criticism to learn from
its mistakes rather than covering them up. The
Bureau's public credibility also enhanced its
information gathering capacity: in its final years of
operation, it was able to obtain information from
within apartheid South Africa itself.
An open nonviolent intelligence system would do
better than the US National Security Agency, CIA and
FBI. It could hardly do worse than the failures of
conventional intelligence - or political controls over
intelligence - prior to 11 September. An open operation
would be far more accountable to the public and could
not so easily become a tool of state elites. Giliam de
Valk thinks that there should be several open
intelligence agencies, with competition between them
to guard against politically biased or self-serving
reports.
A third crucial dimension to a nonviolence strategy
against terrorism is to challenge the conditions that
foster terrorism, including repressive regimes, poverty,
injustice, inequality, exploitation, neocolonialism and
torture. This is familiar territory to nonviolent activists
who have played key roles in opposing apartheid in
South Africa, communist repression in Eastern Europe
and military dictatorships in several continents
(Ackerman and DuVall, 2000). Not all struggles are
successful but many are.
It is remarkable that nonviolent action is ever
successful considering what it is up against. Hundreds
of billions of dollars are spent on militaries every year,
with millions of soldiers in uniform and the most
sophisticated technologies available developed by a
significant proportion of the world's scientists and
engineers. Added to this is production of what can be
called the 'technology of repression,' including
equipment and training for surveillance, crowd control
and torture. Set against this enormous and powerful
system for institutionalised violence and social control
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are networks of action groups with relatively little
money, training or productive capacity.
A fourth component of a nonviolence strategy against
terrorism works by showing results, namely that
nonviolent approaches are more effective than
terrorism in overcoming oppression and repression.
Violence doesn't seem all that effective as a strategy for
challengers: there is not a single case where popular
armed struggle has toppled the government of an
industrialised country. Perhaps the attraction of
violence has less to do with proven or likely
effectiveness and more to do with symbolic expression
of masculine virility or attachment to secrecy,
hierarchy and exclusionary politics. How to challenge
the counterproductive allure of revolutionary violence
is one of the great challenges for nonviolent
communication. For example, in the Middle East there
are excellent nonviolent actions and strategies (Crow
et al., 1990; Dajani, 1994) but such efforts are
overshadowed by violent approaches.

Nonviolence against Hypocrisy
Politicians and others define and think about terrorism
in a way that excludes the role of 'respectable' states in
terrorism. Terrorism is commonly defined as the use of
violence by nonstate groups and so-called 'rogue states'
against civilians for political purposes. This is a very
selective, indeed incoherent, usage (Gearty, 1997).
Dictionaries define terrorism more generically as, for
example, 'an organised system of intimidation,
especially for political ends' or 'the systematic use of
terror especially as a means of coercion' or 'domination
or coercion by intimidation.'
By such definitions, governments can be involved in
terrorism. The evidence is that state terrorism is far
greater than non-state terrorism, but state terrorism,
except in the case of US-government-defined 'rogue
states,' receives little attention (Campbell and Brenner,
2000; Herman, 1982; Stohl and Lopez, 1984). Many
methods of warfare, such as bombing of civilians or
use of anti-personnel weapons, are terroristic. Indeed,
strategic bombing has similarities with genocide
(Markusen and Kopf, 1995). It is well documented that
the US and other western governments have
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repeatedly used, sponsored, supported or tolerated
terrorism and regimes that use it (Blum, 2000;
Chomsky and Herman, 1979). For example, US
bombing in the Southeast Asian war killed hundreds of
thousands of civilians. The US and many other
governments supported Saddam Hussein's regime in
Iraq during the 1980s despite its use of torture and
chemical warfare. Via Pakistan's intelligence service,
the CIA supported the mujahideen in Afghanistan
from the 1980s onwards. This included support for bin
Laden's network (Johnson, 2000). In the US
government's attack on Afghanistan after 11
September, it has forged alliances with governments
and forces known for serious human rights abuses,
including Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan's
Northern Alliance.
One way for nonviolent activists to respond to the selfinterested mindsets of governments about terrorism is
to refuse to accept their antiterrorist agendas and
instead make independent assessments of terror and
repression. Rather than (or as well as) using
nonviolent action against the Gulf War, a more timely
intervention would have been a programme of action
against Saddam Hussein's regime in the 1980s, and
against support for the regime by the US and many
other governments.
A more timely intervention against the 11 September
attacks and the subsequent war in Afghanistan was
possible. The antecedents grew out of the cold war
confrontation between the US and Soviet
governments, one facet of which was superpower
rivalry in Afghanistan, including longstanding Soviet
influence in the country, CIA support for opposition
groups, the 1979 Soviet invasion and subsequent CIA
support for mujahideen opponents, including alQaeda. Thus there were many opportunities for
nonviolent intervention against Soviet and US warmaking and support for terrorist groups.
The most significant actual contribution in this context
was the spontaneous and successful nonviolent
resistance to the 1991 Soviet coup, a resistance that
helped bring an end to the Soviet Union. What has
been lacking is a powerful, systematic programme of
nonviolent action against repression and terrorism in
Afghanistan over the past several decades. This is not a
criticism of the nonviolence movement but rather a
comment on gross disparity between resources
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available for military forces and repression compared
to those available for nonviolent action.

What to do?
In the aftermath of 11 September, there were many
eloquent commentaries criticising the US
government's rush into a 'war on terrorism.' However,
much of this writing seemed written for governments,
as authors either said how counterproductive or
unethical it would be to bomb civilians or encouraged
the addressing of longstanding sources of grievance
(such as the treatment of Palestinians). While I agree
with the arguments, pleas to governments are unlikely
to have much impact. After all, peace activists have
been arguing for decades that war and violence are
counterproductive, but seldom do government leaders
take any notice. In commentaries about 11 September,
little has been said about what individuals can do
besides protest against government policy.
So, what is a supporter of nonviolence to do in the
aftermath of 11 September? Possibilities mentioned
here include supporting technologies that are less
vulnerable to attack, supporting nonviolent
intelligence operations, documenting and promoting
the advantages of nonviolent action compared to
terrorism, and using nonviolent action against
repression and oppression.
Another option is to not be distracted by the rhetoric of
the 'war on terrorism' but instead to carefully assess all
situations involving violence, including state terrorism,
and act where the most impact can be made. This
might include exposing the hypocrisy of governments
when they point the finger only at terrorism by others
and never at their own roles in manufacturing and
exporting weapons and torture equipment, in training
soldiers and torturers, in propping up dictatorships
and undermining democracies, and in fighting wars.
It is wise for nonviolent activists to listen to diverse
voices in the debates that followed 11 September. But
should the nonviolence movement's agenda be
determined by the attacks and the 'war on terrorism'?
Or is it better for individuals and groups to keep doing
the things that they think will be effective?
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Additional comments by
Giliam de Valk
I agree that it is vital to oppose the conditions that
foster terrorism. Another possibility for achieving this
is implementation of a so-called human rights
paragraph. The idea is that if Western security gives
support to a third party - to train them or supply them
with weapons or intelligence - this third party has to
sign a statement supporting human rights. Since
Western security often operates in secrecy, this is far
from a complete remedy. Its main function would
follow the working of the Helsinki Agreements on
human rights. Time after time, dissident and human
rights groups in communist Eastern Europe referred to
the Helsinki Agreements. Like those agreements, a
human rights paragraph could promote a change in
thinking among citizens, including some working
within the security apparatus.
The idea of 'asymmetric conflict' - a conflict between
parties with vastly different resources - can provide
insight into terrorism and responses to it. When the
CIA helped and trained networks and groups in
Afghanistan, these groups fought an asymmetric
conflict with the Soviets: guerrilla warfare. When
finally some of those groups turned against the US,
this guerrilla approach was transformed into
terrorism, which is even more asymmetric than
guerrilla warfare.
I see a tension. Nonviolence is asymmetric to violence.
If you opt for nonviolence in relation to the 11
September attacks, you opt for an answer that is of a
different nature than the stimulus for the attacks
(military support for guerrillas). While I agree that
nonviolence has great potential for preventing
terrorism, there is a tension in relation to the inner
logic of cause and effect if you focus on the phases
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afterward.
I doubt that the attacks would have taken place if
Western security had not dealt the way it did with the
networks that finally turned against the US. If the CIA
- created to support and defend democratic legal order
- had operated with groups that shared these values,
an intervention in Afghanistan would not have
occurred as it did.
Still, we need to develop the capacity for nonviolence.
In general, I agree with the need to discuss terrorism
in relation to nonviolence and think that the major
advantages are related to prevention.
Giliam de Valk (giliamdevalk@hotmail.com) is
completing his dissertation at the universities of
Groningen and Nijenrode on the quality of
intelligence analyses.
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